News that a U.S.
company recently sent vials of a 1957 pandemic flu strain to laboratories
across the world
by accident is only the latest outrage from the billion-dollar boondoggle
called the federal biological weapons program.
As you might recall, the Bush
administration started its "biodefense" spending spree following
the September 2001 deadly anthrax attacks, and one of its first projects
was to genetically engineer a super-resistant, even more deadly version of
the anthrax virus.
Our leaders are nuts.
Unfortunately, Project
"Anthrax" Jefferson has good company. A US
Army scientist in Maryland is currently trying to bring back elements of
the 1918 Spanish flu,
a virus which killed 40 million people. And a virologist in St. Louis has
been working on a more lethal form of mousepox (related to smallpox) -
just to try stopping the virus once it's been created.
Lack of oversight and runaway
spending are exacerbated by the Bush administration's disrespect for the
internationally-recognized Biological Weapons Convention. In short,
reduced pressure on weapons labs to issue declarations and allow
inspections means less accountability - and more opportunities for secrecy
and abuse.
Put bluntly, the increasing
number of stateside bioweapons blunders should come as no surprise. In
February 2003, for example, the University of California at Davis (UCD)
took a full ten days to inform nearby communities that a rhesus monkey had
escaped from its primate-breeding facility. Coincidentally, UCD had been
vying for government funds to set up its own "hot zone"
biodefense lab which could use primates for biological weapons testing. If
that monkey had been infected with ebola, or some other virus, it's
unclear when or if the public would have been informed.
At roughly the same time that
the monkey ditched UCD, the Pentagon unearthed over 2,000 tons of
hazardous biological waste in Maryland, much of it undocumented leftovers
of an abandoned germ warfare program. Nearby, the FBI was draining a pond
for clues into 2001's anthrax attacks.
Doesn't inspire much trust in
the transparency of US biological weapons programs.
And things appear only to be
getting worse.
In 2004, a whopping $6
billion went up for grabs for federal biodefense programs, and
laboratories across the country went ballistic trying to get their hands
on some of that cash. Predictably, cases of fraud and abuse quickly
surfaced.
In June 2004, for example, the
Army was caught shirking inspections at a major biodefense lab under its
domain. The
scandal went back to 1999, when the Army commissioned a biological and
chemical weapons-agent lab at Tennessee's Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
Oversight regulations obligated the Army to inspect the lab each year
thereafter, and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) were supposed to
have inspected the lab on a regular basis too.
Everything seemed to be
running smoothly; in December 2003, the committee in charge of safety at
the Oak Ridge lab announced that it "remains comfortable of the
review and inspections of the Chem/Bio Facility conducted by the CDC and
the Army."
Small problem. In 2004, the
Department of Energy's Inspector General discovered that the Army actually
hadn't inspected the Oak Ridge biodefense lab for the previous three
years, and that the CDC hadn't been there for four years. Yet the lab's
safety committee said it was "comfortable" with the imaginary
inspections.
Also in 2004, a military
biodefense contractor called Southern Research landed in hot water by
accidentally sending live anthrax across the country from Frederick,
Maryland to the Children's Hospital of Oakland (California). To make
matters worse, it turns out that Southern Research's lab in Frederick,
Maryland didn't even maintain the institutional biosafety committee
required by federal research rules. The punishment for these acts of gross
incompetence and irresponsibility? The Bush administration gave Southern
Research the task of safeguarding a new $30 million biological weapons
facility being built near Chicago.
In September of the same
year, three lab workers at the Boston University Medical Center were
accidentally exposed to a potentially lethal biowarfare agent called
tularaemia bacterium. The lab didn't report the tularemia infections until
two months later though - after it had won a contract to build a new, $178
million biodefense laboratory.
Concerns about lack of
transparency and monetary waste aside, the administration's bioweapons
buildup raises obvious ethical problems. Why should the U.S. create newer,
even deadlier viruses? Who are these catastrophic weapons going to be
tested on? What populations will they ultimately be used against?
These questions take on
urgent meaning given the Bush administration's military adventurism
coupled with the US media's poor coverage regarding war victims. For
example, eyewitnesses
to the late-2004 attack on Fallujah claimed that US forces used poisonous
gases, and "weird" bombs
that exploded into fires that burned the skin despite water being thrown
on the burns - a telltale sign of napalm or phosphorus bombs.
UK reaction to the revelation
was swift and strong, with demands that Prime Minister Blair remove
British troops from Iraq until the US ceased from using such savage
weaponry. Labor MP Alice Mahon demanded that Blair make "an emergency
statement to the Commons to explain why this is happening. It begs the
question: 'Did we know about this hideous weapon's use in Iraq?'"
No similar outrage in
Congress. In fact, no comment at all. The US mainstream media didn't cover
the "weird bomb" allegations.
But it doesn't take a genius
to put two-and-two together: if we permit our government to ignore
international weapons-control conventions and then say nothing while fresh
billions are invested in barbaric new weaponry, we lose the right to act
surprised when our own military uses that weaponry on innocent civilians
abroad.
Or even on us.
You may be surprised to learn
that in 2003, the
Pentagon quietly admitted to having used biological/chemical agents on
5,842 service members
in secret tests conducted over a ten-year period (1962-73).
In operations called Project
112 and Project SHAD, the Defense Department tested its own weapons on
service members aboard Navy ships, and in all sorts of other nasty ways -
such as spraying a Hawaiian rainforest and parts of Oahu. All in all,
tests were conducted in six states (Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Maryland, Utah) as well as in Canada and Britain.
Many military personnel were
not informed when the toxic agents were being tested on them. Only decades
later, as crucial documents slowly become declassified, have the veterans'
health complaints been acknowledged.
You might think such
barbarism could never happen again: too many legal protections for
citizens in place. Think again.
There's a tricky clause in
Chapter 32/Title 50 of the United States Code (the aggregation of US
general and permanent laws) which states that the Secretary of Defense can
conduct a chemical or biological agent test or experiment on humans in
certain cases
"if informed consent has been obtained."
So far so good. But check out
a different part of Chapter 32, Section 1515, entitled "Suspension;
Presidential authorization":
"After November
19, 1969, the operation of this chapter, or any portion thereof, may be
suspended by the President during the period of any war declared by
Congress and during the period of any national emergency declared by
Congress or by the President."
You got it. If the
President or Congress decides we're at war then the Secretary of Defense
doesn't need anybody's consent to test chemical or biological agents on
human beings. Gives one pause during these days of a perpetual "War
on Terror."
In January 2005, US Senate
majority leader Bill Frist called for a new Manhattan Project (referring
to the WWII-era nuclear weapons bonanza) for biological weapons.
Frist told an audience at the World Economic Forum, "The greatest
existential threat we have in the world today is biological," and he
went on to predict a biowarfare attack "at some time in the next 10
years."
How ironic that while Frist
cited the 2001 US anthrax attacks as proof more biological weapons
research was necessary, he failed to mention that those incidents involved
anthrax produced right in the good 'ole USA - or that the primary suspect
in the attacks was a US Army scientist. Frist also didn't clarify how
developing even more biological warfare agents would make the world safer.
The
original Manhattan Project ultimately led to US forces dropping atom bombs
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with the resulting slaughter of hundreds of
thousands of people. It's terrifying to consider the potential
repercussions, both domestic and abroad, of the Bush administration's
coveted new biological-weapons Manhattan Project.