QUOTE
Chronciles of Dissent
p.308-311.
David Barsamian: The U.S. has had a relationship with the Kurds that's been rather mixed, to say the least. Beginning in the early 1970s, through Massoud Barzani and the Kurdish movement inside Iraq at that time. Can you talk about that?
Chomsky: The relationship with the Kurds goes back a little ways beyond that. In the 1920s that was British turf, not U.S. turf, and we might remember that it was the British that used poison gas largely against the Kurds. Against others too, but largely the Kurds, as part of their terror campaign when they tried to establish the state of Iraq under British control, as they cut it out of the Ottoman Empire. That was Winston Churchill's contribution to peace and joy among nations. He was the official who authorized the use of poison gas and bitterly denounced the "squeamishness" of people who were opposed to using the modern means of warfare.
There's an older history, too. But starting around the early 1970s there was a Kurdish revolt supported by Iran. The Shah at that time was the main U.S. ally. He wanted to cause some trouble for Iraq. One of the ways of causing trouble was to sponsor a Kurdish revolt in the north. The U.S. then under Kissinger went along with that, helped out. Later revelations by the Pike Committee were leaked and published in the Village Voice, though as far as I know I don't think they were published in book form in the U.S. They were published in a book in England, by a small publisher. Nobody wanted to see this stuff, but it was a very important report. The Pike Committee report, which had a lot of documentation, included cables and other statements, with the names blanked out, but it's obvious who it is, between Kissinger and Iran, making it very clear that neither the U.S. nor Iran wanted the Kurds to win. In fact, they didn't want the Kurds to win, they wanted them to fight and bloody Iraq, but not to win. That was crucial. They were frank about that. This was intended as pressure on Iraq to settle some border issue about access to the Gulf.
When Iraq backed off and accepted the Iranian demands, Iran, the U.S. ally, canceled its support for the Kurds. The U.S. also canceled its support. They were left then to be slaughtered. Iraq knew that this was going to happen and was prepared for it, so it began the slaughter right off. Very similar to what we've just seen. The Kurdish leader, Barzani, didn't understand this at all. He was so pro-U.S. he once said that this new Kurdistan should become the 51st state. He was shocked, as the Kurds were generally, to see how crudely they were sold out by the U.S. once they were no longer needed. The U.S. refused to provide even humanitarian aid, not even that, to the Kurds as they were getting slaughtered by Saddam Hussein. The Iranians forced back Kurdish refugees. It was a pretty bloody and ugly scene. That's when a U.S. high official, later allegedly identified as Kissinger, made the famous statement, apparently in secret Congressional testimony, that we shouldn't confuse foreign policy with missionary work. Our foreign policy was to inspire a Kurdish rebellion but make sure that it didn't succeed, and then when it was no longer needed pull the rug out from under them and get them slaughtered by Saddam Hussein. That's foreign policy. You didn't want to raise questions about missionary work or talk to the Maryknoll fathers. You're in serious company now.
Actually, I admire Kissinger for saying that. I don't think one should denounce him. He's just honest. And in fact, he's right. Foreign policy is not missionary work.
Later, in the early 1980s, the record is murky. We don't have much evidence. There have been no leaked congressional reports about it. There may have been some kind of tentative arrangements made between the Kurds and Saddam Hussein, in the context of the Iran-Iraq war. At that time again Iraq was weak and needed quiet in the north. It didn't want a revolt up there. So they had an autonomy arrangement with the Kurds. That one fell through by about 1984, which was just about the time that the U.S. was making its dramatic shift towards support for Saddam Hussein. The reasons why that fell through, why Iraq backed off from that agreement, have never been well documented, but general belief reported recently by the London Economist is that this was under Turkish pressure. The Turks have never wanted independence for the Kurds. About a quarter of the population of Turkey is Kurdish, although they don't concede it, and their own repression of Kurds is vicious, stepped up again during the Gulf War. But it appears they were worried about these moves towards independence and what effect they'd have within Turkey. Apparently they have a threat that they hold over Iraq, namely, they control the pipeline, and especially during the war that was the way in which Iraq couldn't send oil through the Gulf, but it could send it through the Turkish pipeline.
Apparently Turkey threatened to close the pipeline if Iraq proceeded with these arrangements, and at that point Saddam Hussein backed off and that one fell through. All of this must have been with U.S. support. Turkey is a close U.S. ally. At that time Saddam Hussein was becoming a U.S. ally. On this we only have indirect evidence, but that's the way it looks. I mentioned a London Economist report which gave it this way as fact, without giving their own sources. That was the second one. The third one is what we have seen in the last couple of months.
p.308-311.
David Barsamian: The U.S. has had a relationship with the Kurds that's been rather mixed, to say the least. Beginning in the early 1970s, through Massoud Barzani and the Kurdish movement inside Iraq at that time. Can you talk about that?
Chomsky: The relationship with the Kurds goes back a little ways beyond that. In the 1920s that was British turf, not U.S. turf, and we might remember that it was the British that used poison gas largely against the Kurds. Against others too, but largely the Kurds, as part of their terror campaign when they tried to establish the state of Iraq under British control, as they cut it out of the Ottoman Empire. That was Winston Churchill's contribution to peace and joy among nations. He was the official who authorized the use of poison gas and bitterly denounced the "squeamishness" of people who were opposed to using the modern means of warfare.
There's an older history, too. But starting around the early 1970s there was a Kurdish revolt supported by Iran. The Shah at that time was the main U.S. ally. He wanted to cause some trouble for Iraq. One of the ways of causing trouble was to sponsor a Kurdish revolt in the north. The U.S. then under Kissinger went along with that, helped out. Later revelations by the Pike Committee were leaked and published in the Village Voice, though as far as I know I don't think they were published in book form in the U.S. They were published in a book in England, by a small publisher. Nobody wanted to see this stuff, but it was a very important report. The Pike Committee report, which had a lot of documentation, included cables and other statements, with the names blanked out, but it's obvious who it is, between Kissinger and Iran, making it very clear that neither the U.S. nor Iran wanted the Kurds to win. In fact, they didn't want the Kurds to win, they wanted them to fight and bloody Iraq, but not to win. That was crucial. They were frank about that. This was intended as pressure on Iraq to settle some border issue about access to the Gulf.
When Iraq backed off and accepted the Iranian demands, Iran, the U.S. ally, canceled its support for the Kurds. The U.S. also canceled its support. They were left then to be slaughtered. Iraq knew that this was going to happen and was prepared for it, so it began the slaughter right off. Very similar to what we've just seen. The Kurdish leader, Barzani, didn't understand this at all. He was so pro-U.S. he once said that this new Kurdistan should become the 51st state. He was shocked, as the Kurds were generally, to see how crudely they were sold out by the U.S. once they were no longer needed. The U.S. refused to provide even humanitarian aid, not even that, to the Kurds as they were getting slaughtered by Saddam Hussein. The Iranians forced back Kurdish refugees. It was a pretty bloody and ugly scene. That's when a U.S. high official, later allegedly identified as Kissinger, made the famous statement, apparently in secret Congressional testimony, that we shouldn't confuse foreign policy with missionary work. Our foreign policy was to inspire a Kurdish rebellion but make sure that it didn't succeed, and then when it was no longer needed pull the rug out from under them and get them slaughtered by Saddam Hussein. That's foreign policy. You didn't want to raise questions about missionary work or talk to the Maryknoll fathers. You're in serious company now.
Actually, I admire Kissinger for saying that. I don't think one should denounce him. He's just honest. And in fact, he's right. Foreign policy is not missionary work.
Later, in the early 1980s, the record is murky. We don't have much evidence. There have been no leaked congressional reports about it. There may have been some kind of tentative arrangements made between the Kurds and Saddam Hussein, in the context of the Iran-Iraq war. At that time again Iraq was weak and needed quiet in the north. It didn't want a revolt up there. So they had an autonomy arrangement with the Kurds. That one fell through by about 1984, which was just about the time that the U.S. was making its dramatic shift towards support for Saddam Hussein. The reasons why that fell through, why Iraq backed off from that agreement, have never been well documented, but general belief reported recently by the London Economist is that this was under Turkish pressure. The Turks have never wanted independence for the Kurds. About a quarter of the population of Turkey is Kurdish, although they don't concede it, and their own repression of Kurds is vicious, stepped up again during the Gulf War. But it appears they were worried about these moves towards independence and what effect they'd have within Turkey. Apparently they have a threat that they hold over Iraq, namely, they control the pipeline, and especially during the war that was the way in which Iraq couldn't send oil through the Gulf, but it could send it through the Turkish pipeline.
Apparently Turkey threatened to close the pipeline if Iraq proceeded with these arrangements, and at that point Saddam Hussein backed off and that one fell through. All of this must have been with U.S. support. Turkey is a close U.S. ally. At that time Saddam Hussein was becoming a U.S. ally. On this we only have indirect evidence, but that's the way it looks. I mentioned a London Economist report which gave it this way as fact, without giving their own sources. That was the second one. The third one is what we have seen in the last couple of months.